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Introduction
There was a time, not long ago, when inequality in the distribution of income and wealth was widely considered inconsequential to mainstream macroeconomics.
Distribution and related topics in welfare economics were seen as normative in nature, and were relegated to microeconomic study. Many economists envisaged a dichotomy separating distribution and such from real macroeconomic issues, doubting that distribution could matter much for macroeconomic outcomes. The idea that rich and poor households have different propensities to consume and save as Kaldor (1961) argued, with potentially important consequences for short-term macroeconomic analysis as well as for medium-to-long-term growth, did not leave a lasting imprint on mainstream macroeconomics. Also, the notion that consumers and workers care about relative incomes and wages as argued by Duesenberry (1949) and later also by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984a, b) , Acocella et al. (2009) , Card et al. (2012) , and others makes only occasional appearances in macroeconomic models. and India, inequality among nations has decreased as inequality within nations has increased since 1980 (Milanovic 2016) . From the 1980s to 2015, the top 1% of households increased its share of pre-tax national income from 8% to 12% in Europe and from 8% to 20% in United States. Over the same period, the top 1% of households increased its share of net national wealth from 20% to 40% in both Europe and United
States (World Inequality Database 2018) . In 2017, it took ordinary workers the whole 1 See also Stiglitz (2015) . 2 See also Milanovic (2016). year -364 days! -to earn the average daily compensation of J. P. Morgan´s Chief Executive Officer. 3 We could go on. Gallup (2013) 
respondents in the United
States considered corruption to be "widespread throughout the government" compared with 46% in Canada. reports that the proportion of its U. S. respondents expressing a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the Supreme Court declined from 49% in 1975 to 37% in 2018 while confidence in Congress dropped from 42% to 11%.
Life expectancy in the United States declined in 2015, 2016, and 2017, the first time since the First World War that U. S. life expectancy has fallen three years in a row (Case and Deaton 2017) . Freedom House (2018) This study is intended to chart cross-country relationships among various aspects of social capital, including income distribution and democracy, and economic growth as reflected in the purchasing power of per capita Gross National Income (GNI). The point of departure is that long-run economic growth is driven by the buildup and use of four kinds of capital: Physical capital, Human capital, Natural capital, and Social capital. Five pillars of social capital will be stressed: Democracy, Equality, Rule of Law, Transparency, and Trust. The accumulation of physical capital boosts growth directly while human capital, social capital, and natural capital, if well managed, encourage growth indirectly by promoting efficiency and technology.
The strategy of the study is to explore the bivariate cross-country relationships between the purchasing power of the level of current (i.e., most recent) per capita income and each of the various potential determinants of growth shown in Figure 1 
From double diversification to growth
Economic diversification and democracy can be seen as two sides of the same coin.
Economic diversification means diversification of exports and output away from excessive dependence on natural resources. Political diversification means increased democracy, i.e., diversification away from excessive dependence on a narrow political base toward political pluralism. Both types of diversification aim to avert national risk.
Most countries, especially those that rely on a few industries or resources for much of their incomes, seek to diversify their economies because they view diversification as an essential aspect of national risk management. Some may suspect that, by reducing risk, diversification may also encourage economic efficiency and growth as argued in Gylfason and Wijkman (2016) . The modest aim here is merely to erect some statistical scaffolding by reviewing simple bivariate correlations among different aspects of social capital, diversification, and growth in preparation for more comprehensive multivariate econometric work. Political diversification is measured by the Polity IV Project's Polity2 variable, which reflects several characteristics of democratic vs. autocratic authority in governance. The index spans a spectrum from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed authority regimes ("anocracies") to fully institutionalized democracies on a 21-point scale ranging from minus ten (hereditary monarchy) to plus ten (consolidated democracy).
In Figure 2 , the coordinates of each observation represent average values of the two indices for a given country in a sample of 148 countries. The correlation between the two series is 0.66. 4 Figures 3 and 4 show the relationship between each type of diversification and per capita GNI. In both figures, the variable on the vertical axis is the natural log of the purchasing power of per capita GNI in 2016 on the grounds that the level of current income reflects past rates of growth. The use of only the end-of-period value of per capita GNI for each country rules out reverse causation from income to diversification.
In Figure 3 , with a correlation of 0.46 between economic diversification and income, the relationship shown is significant in a statistical sense. It is also significant in an economic sense because the slope of the regression line through the scatter (0.47)
suggests that an increase in economic diversification by 20% of the scale of the diversification index along the horizontal axis (i.e., by 1 which is one-fifth of the scale from 2 to 7) is accompanied across countries by a nearly 50% increase in per capita GNI we may have here a new reason to think that excessive dependence on natural resources, by reducing diversification and exposing the economic system to risk, can slow down economic growth over time as suggested by Sachs and Warner (1995) and others. If not well managed, i.e., if allowed to result in rampant rent seeking, repeated bouts of Dutch disease, and such, natural capital may, unlike other types of capital, undermine long-run economic growth. The same does not apply to human capital and social capital to which we now turn.
Transparency, rule of law, and trust
Transparency is an important ingredient of social capital, understood here to constitute the adhesive that holds society together and enables it to prosper through solid arrangements and institutions that are governed by the rule of law and enjoy well- • Trust in the U. S. presidency decreased from 52% in 1975 to 32% in 2017.
• Trust in OECD banks decreased from 55% in 2007 to 46% in 2015. Figure 13 suggests a correlation of 0.77 between the rule of law and transparency.
To summarize, we have seen in this section that three important pillars of social capital -transparency, rule of law, and trust -vary directly with export diversification and democracy across countries as well as with one another. The next question is whether each of these three variables -transparency, rule of law, and trust -can be seen to vary systematically also with per capita GNI across countries. Figures 14, 15, and 16 suggest that they do. Figure 14 shows how trust and per capita income go together across countries. The correlation is 0.47. In Figure 15 , the correlation between the rule of law index and per capita income is 0.73. In Figure 16 , the correlation between transparency and per capita GNI is 0.60. Each of these pillars of social capital varies strongly with per capita income across countries just as each of them was earlier seen to vary directly with export diversification and democracy. Thus far, everything hangs together.
In the next section we ask whether yet another pillar of social capital, equality, fits the general pattern described here. Figure 17 where the variable shown on both axes is 100 minus one or the other of the two Gini indices. This is done to have equality rise along the axes. In Figure 18 , trust and equality are seen to go hand in hand from country to country. Equality inspires trust.
Trust fosters equality. The correlation is 0.46. Essentially the same pattern emerges when Figure 18 is reproduced by using the standardized SWIID Gini index is used in lieu of the World Bank Gini index for a larger sample of 103 countries (not shown).
How does equality interact with the rule of law and transparency? Figure 19 shows the relationship between the rule of law as measured in Figures 7, 8 , 12, 13, and 15 and equality as measured in Figure 18 . The correlation between the two is 0.44. Figure 20 shows the relationship between transparency as measured in Figures 5, 6 , 11, 13, and Next we ask: How does equality interact with the two types of diversification? Figure 21 describes the cross-country relationship between equality and export diversification. The relationship between equality and democracy is weaker as shown in Figure 22 where the correlation between the two variables is 0.17. Using the standardized index rather than the World Bank index increases the sample size from 146 to 156 and the correlation from 0.17 to 0.22 but produces a similar pattern (not shown). Even if the correlation is weak, however, the slope of the regression line in Figure 22 is statistically significant (t = 2.0). In sum, the general pattern remains quite clear, by and large, even if some transmission channels appear more open than others. Several different components of social capital tend to move together in ways that reinforce its uplifting effect on economic growth. Berg and Ostry (2017) and Berg et al. (2018) . 6 Equality appears to be good for growth across the globe, partly perhaps because equality goes along with several other ingredients of social capital -democracy, transparency, trust, and the rule of law -that are also good for growth. Good things go together. Taken together, Figures 22 and 23 suggest that inequality undermines democracy and growth. 
Conclusion
Where do we stand at the end of this brief bird´s-eye-type tour of international crosssectional data on economic performance in conjunction with the interplay of different ingredients of social capital? We have seen statistically and economically significant bivariate cross-country relationships between the variables shown in Figure 1 , pair by pair. Specifically, we have seen that 6 See also Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Persson and Tabellini (1994) , and Gylfason and Zoega (2003) . For a survey of the literature on inequality in macroeconomics, see Rios-Rull and Quadrini (2015) . • Income equality is positively correlated with trust, the rule of law, and transparency (Figures 18, 19, and 20) and also with export diversification, democracy, and per capita GNI across countries (Figures 21, 22 , and 23).
In sum, various aspects of social capital -democracy, transparency, rule of law, trust, and equality -have been shown to vary systematically and significantly with one another and with economic diversification as well as with per capita income.
These relationships matter to the modern world. A burgeoning political science literature now describes the United States as an oligarchy that systematically disrespects the will of the people (Page and Gilens 2017) . Many Europeans and others also worry about recent political developments within the European Union, especially in Hungary and Poland in view of their governments´ advocacy of "illiberal democracy."
The grim lessons from the early 20th century remind us that increased inequality has undermined democracy before (Snyder 2018 ). More could hardly be at stake.
Reasonable equality in the distribution of income, wealth, and health, the rule of law, democracy, pluralism, transparency, trust, and economic welfare underpinned by rapid growth are not only desirable in themselves, each in its own right, but they also appear to hang together across countries through an intricate web of bivariate linkages.
Weakening one risks weakening the others. All of these different aspects of social capital are good for growth, as are saving, investment, education, and health care while natural resources can cut both ways. When so many different determinants of growth are closely correlated, however, the usefulness of multiple cross-country growth regressions may suffer due to multicollinearity.
